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MISSION AND SCOPE: The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center 
(IATPC) was established in 1990 in the Food and Resource Economics Department 
(FRED) of the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of 
Florida. Its mission is to provide information, education, and research directed to 
immediate and long-term enhancement and sustainability of international trade and 
natural resource use. Its scope includes not only trade and related policy issues, but also 
agricultural, rural, resource, environmental, food, state, national and international 




 The Center’s objectives are to: 
 
•  Serve as a university-wide focal point and resource base for research on 
international agricultural trade and trade policy issues 
•  Facilitate dissemination of agricultural trade related research results and 
publications 
•  Encourage interaction between researchers, business and industry groups, 
state and federal agencies, and policymakers in the examination and 
discussion of agricultural trade policy questions 
•  Provide support to initiatives that enable a better understanding of trade and 
policy issues that impact the competitiveness of Florida and southeastern 
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Abstract: European Union (EU) consumers pay almost twice the competitive world price 
for many agricultural products. Agricultural subsidies accounted for almost half of the 
EU’s total budget (US$ 40 billion on agriculture in 2000) although agriculture 
represented 1.7 percent of the EU’s GDP and employs 4.3% of the EU’s population. 
Domestic policies for citrus and tomatoes include export refunds, product withdraws 
from the market, intervention thresholds, and direct producer aid. Domestic policies for 
dairy include export refunds, intervention thresholds, aid for private storage, disposal aid, 
and milk quotas. The EU’s intentions are to enhance agricultural competitiveness by 
setting product intervention as “a real safety net measure, allowing EU producers to 
respond to market signals while protecting them from extreme price fluctuations,” and 
promoting market oriented, sustainable agriculture by finishing the transition from 
product support to producer support, by introducing a “decoupled system of payments per 
farm” which are not connected to production. The EU wishes to allow flexibility in 
production, but also guarantee income stability to producers.  Within the last 10 years, the 
EU has reduced price supports and increased direct payments to tomato, dairy, and citrus 
farmers to compensate them for the reductions.   4
 
EUROPEAN UNION FARM POLICY FOR CITRUS, TOMATOES, AND DAIRY 
 




Since the advent of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in 1962 that helped 
lay the foundation for the European Union
2 (EU), Europe has taken a strong protectionist 
stance with respect to its agricultural markets.
3  This is especially true for European 
products like dairy and fresh fruits and vegetables that are relatively vulnerable to foreign 
competition due to domestic prices well above world price levels.   
European consumers pay 45%
4 more for food because of the EU’s domestic farm 
programs. EU farmers receive almost twice the world price
5 for many agricultural 
products. Fortunately, recent EU GATT and later WTO membership has successfully 
forced changes to the CAP that result in less domestic support for European agricultural 
markets.  As a result, “Fortress Europe,” as many American exporters call the EU, is 
becoming more accessible to world agriculture producers, including Florida farmers.  In 
2001, the EU was a net exporter to the US with a Euro 2.63 billion surplus and the US 
                                                 
1 Adams, Damian C., J.D. and PhD student, Food and Resource Economics Department and Richard L. 
Kilmer, Professor, Food and Resource Economics Department, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL and a 
member of the International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center (IATPC) at the University of Florida. 
2 There are fifteen full members of the EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.  See 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/E/EuropnU1n.asp 
3 http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/1962/1962_en.htm (Accessed October 17, 2002).  Ironically, the GATT 
negotiations would begin less than a year after the formation of the CAP.   The CAP was primarily 
concerned with reducing barriers to trade between European Economic EU (EEC and later EU) members 
and ensuring a stable food supply.  In 1965, when financing of the CAP was being negotiated by EEC 
members, France, the largest agricultural producer in the EU, broke off negotiations, recalled its Permanent 
Representative to the EEC, and refused to take part in official meetings relating to the EEC until its desires 
concerning farm subsidies and external trade barriers were met.  See generally 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/history  
4 Fuller, Thomas. “Berlin and Paris agree to cap EU farm spending.” International Herald Tribune Online, 
October 25, 2002. http://www.iht.com/articles/74838.html(Accessed October 25, 2002).   5
was a net importer from the EU with a Euro 5.65 billion deficit.  In 2000, the values are 
2.63 billion and 5.51 billion, respectively.
6  In 2000, Euro 1 = US 1.12.
7   
The level of EU support of agricultural markets is decreasing, but still relatively 
high compared to the US (although this may have changed somewhat with the most 
recent Farm Bill) and the rest of the world.  The recent changes have signaled a trend 
away from market-distorting actions and toward direct payments to producers.   
Agricultural subsidies accounted for almost half of the EU’s total budget (US$ 40 billion 
on agriculture in 2000) although agriculture is a very small part of the European 
economy.
8   In 2000, agriculture represented 1.7 percent of the EU’s GDP, and employed 
4.3% of the European population.
9  In 1999, the EU appropriated Euro 40,440 million for 
agricultural support spending Table 1), of which Euro 10,301.4 million was spent on 
market support and Euro 29,239.4 million was spent on direct aid to producers.
10  Market 
support includes export refunds (Euro 5,572.8 million in 1999), storage (Euro 1,568.3), 
guidance premiums (Euro 154.3 million), processing and consumption aid (Euro 2,684.3 
million), withdrawals (Euro 346.2 million) and miscellaneous (Euro 24.5 million).
11  
European support of agriculture is still very high compared to the US.
12 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 - 0034. The 
“producer subsidy equivalent” for milk is 54% of the value of output compared to 44% for all agricultural 
products. 
6 Europe Trade statistics, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/goods/agri/stats.htm 
7 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of the 
European Communities at 132. 
8 USDA-ERS briefing room, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/EuropeanUnion/basicinfo.htm  
9 USDA-ERS briefing room, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/EuropeanUnion/basicinfo.htm  
10 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of 
the European Communities at 134. 
11 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of 
the European Communities at 134. 
12 “Comparison of Domestic Support: US-EU”, http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/tradepolicy/europe/ams98-
99.pdf.  For the 1998/99 marketing year, EU total Aggregate Measure of Support was 51,351 million 
dollars, compared to 10,392 million dollars of support in the US.   6
 
Table 1. EU agricultural spending by commodity and economic type, 1990-
2000
13 
Spending  category  1990 1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
14 2000
15
Millions Ecu, Euro                     
Dairy  4955.9 5636.6  4006.82 5211.3 4248.83 4013 3441.1 2984.9 2596.7  2581 2643
    Export refunds  1930.8 2249  2056.15 2287.5 1926.75 2267 1605.2 NA  1426.7  1259 1417
    Intervention  3025.1 3387.6  1950.66 2923.8 2322.08 1746 1835.9 NA  1170  1322 1226
Fruit and 
vegetables 
1253 1106.5  1261.7 1663.9 1556.84 1557 1581.1 1555.3 1509.5  1661 1654
    Export refunds  80.6 94.8  116.72 187.4 216.67 239 98.4 NA  58.3  65 60
    Intervention  1172.4 1011.7  1145.00 1476.5 1340.17 1317 1482.7 NA  1842  1596 1501.5
Total Market 
Organization 
24,850 30,334  30,128 33,223 29,947 30,956 37,790 37,838 36,729  37,165 35,720
Other Direct 
Payments 
1,604 1,450  1,241 2,128 1,105 424 1,318 2,585 2,019  3,275 4,806
Total Market 
Support 
26,454 32,386  31,369 35,352 32,970 34,503 39,108 40,423 38,749  40,440 40,526
Miscellaneous  1,974 2,306  2,983 3,336 3,335 3,609 4,044 4,399 4,525  5,691 2,668
Total agricultural 
spending 








36,189 43,035  44,549 45,354 42,412 49,993 54,717 50,710 48,466  49,222 48,377
 
In general, the EU intends to enhance European agricultural competitiveness by 
setting product intervention as “a real safety net measure, allowing EU producers to 
respond to market signals while protecting them from extreme price fluctuations,” and 
promoting market oriented, sustainable agriculture by finishing the transition from 
product support to producer support, by introducing a “decoupled system of payments per 
farm” which are not connected to production
18 The EU wishes to allow flexibility in 
production, but also guarantee income stability to producers.  Within the last 10 years, the 
                                                 
13 USDA-ERS briefing room, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/EuropeanUnion/PolicyCommon.htm. The 
data from the US differs slightly from EU data due to rounding. 
14 The data for 1999 and 2000 represent EU appropriations rather than actual spending. 
15 The data for 1999 and 2000 represent EU appropriations rather than actual spending. 
16 The ECU, or European Currency Unit, was the predecessor to the Euro. 
17 Instead of the USDA-ERS projection, this is the actual exchange rate for the 2000 marketing year.  See 
The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of the 
European Communities at 132.   7
EU has reduced price supports and increased direct payments to tomato, dairy, and citrus 
farmers to compensate them for the reductions.  
The EU has an arsenal of support mechanisms for domestic agriculture.  This 
paper inventories EU laws that provide the mechanisms for support of domestic 
agriculture and discusses how they may affect Florida’s dairy, tomato, and citrus 
producers.  
By WTO standards, “high” tariffs—17.3% on average—apply at the European 
border but preferential trade agreements with tariff quotas allow some countries access to 
the EU markets at reduced rates.
19  These preferential agreements are consistent with 
WTO regulations, and offer lower tariffs to former colonies, developing nations, and EU 
neighbors.  The US is not a party to any bilateral trade agreements with the EU that 
reduce the tariff rate for agricultural (or any other) products below the Most Favored 
Nation rate.   
Following the successful negotiation of the 1993 Uruguay Round of GATT 
(Uruguay), the EU has made attempts at liberalizing agricultural markets, including 
citrus, tomatoes, and dairy, and moving from market distorting supports to less market 
distorting regulation.
20  This paper explains the domestic market support mechanisms for 
citrus, tomatoes and dairy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term Review 
of the Common Agricultural Policy”, Com (2002) 394 final, Brussels, 10.7.2002 at 1.   
19 “European Union: July 2000” WTO press release, 
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp137_e.htm  
20 “The CAP: History and Attempts at Reform”, Richard Howarth, 
http://www.openrepublic.org/policyanalyses/Agriculture/IEA_REFORMING_THE_CAP/200000601_CAP
_HISTORY_AND_ATTMEPTS_AT_REFORM_IEA.pdf , visited 10/17/02.   8
Support Mechanisms For Citrus 
  After Uruguay, the EU citrus market underwent some significant changes in 1996 
with the reform of the common organization of the fruit and vegetable market.
21  
Common organization generally refers to the regulatory system of a particular 
agricultural sector under the CAP.  In addition to the 1996 reforms with respect to many 
fresh fruits and vegetables—Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common organization of 
the market in fruit and vegetables and Regulation and (EC) No 2201/96 on the common 
organization of the market in processed fruit and vegetables— the citrus market is also 
subject to Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 introducing an aid scheme for producers of 
certain citrus fruits that has since been duplicated in other markets, including the tomato 
market.  In particular, the scheme
22 provides “compensatory aid” directly to Producer 
Organizations (PO) delivering oranges and other citrus harvested in the EU for 
processing in the EU under contracts with processors.
23  PO’s are very similar to U.S. 
cooperatives.  
The EU is a major exporter of citrus, exporting 16% of the world lemon 
production and 12% of world orange production in 2000.
24  The EU also produces 
mandarins, clementines, and satsumas, but no trade information was available.  In 1998, 
                                                 
21 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common 
organization of the fruit and vegetables market, 2201/96 on the common organization of the processed fruit 
and vegetables market, and 2202/96, which introduced an EU aid scheme for producers of certain citrus 
fruits.  Article (1) “EU aid scheme is hereby established for producer organizations which deliver for 
processing certain citrus fruits harvested in the EU.” 
22 Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 of 28 October 1996 introducing a EU aid scheme for producers of 
certain citrus fruits, Official Journal L 297, 21/11/1996 P. 0049 – 0052. 
23 Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 of 28 October 1996 Article (2), “The scheme referred to in Article 
1 shall be based on contracts between, on the one hand, producer organizations recognized or provisionally 
admitted under Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 and, on the other, processors or legally constituted 
associations or unions of processors.” 
24 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of 
the European Communities at 69.   9
EU citrus exports represented 67% of the import level.
25 For the 1999/2000 marketing 
year, EU citrus production totaled 10.2 million tons, which was up 18% from 1998/99 
and roughly equivalent to 1997/8 levels.  Spain is the EU’s largest producer by far, with 
56% of the total citrus production in 1999/2000.  Orange production in 2000 was 5.8 
million tons, which is a 22% increase over 1998/99.   
Export Refunds and Other Trade Policies 
Export refunds defray some of the difference between the internal European price 
and the world market price of citrus to allow the European citrus producers to dispose of 
excess citrus without affecting internal European prices.
26  As of 1996, an additional duty 
rate may be levied on certain products entering the EU when “conditions set out in 
Article 5 of the Agreement on agriculture [article 16] concluded in the framework of the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations have been fulfilled.”
27   
Product Withdrawals 
In an effort to preserve high internal prices and to somewhat offset seasonal 
production gluts, citrus producers may remove citrus from the market via POs.  These 
POs are a collection of producers that are organized and controlled much like 
cooperatives in the United States, with legal means of exerting otherwise illegal market 
influence.    In 1999, 1008 POs, which represent 40% of the fruit and vegetable 
                                                 
25 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of 
the European Communities at 70. 
26 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 Article 35 (1) “To the extent necessary to enable economically significant 
quantities of the products listed in Article 1 (2) to be exported on the basis of the prices of these products in 
international trade but within the limits resulting from agreements concluded in accordance with Article 
228 of the Treaty, the difference between those prices and prices in the EU may be covered by export 
refunds.” 
27 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 Article 33, 1.  Certain import volumes or prices trigger these additional 
duties.  Article 34 also set out import quotas for certain products.   10
production in the EU, “submitted operational programs” necessary for EU financing.  In 
2000, it was 1120.
28   
Market withdrawals are financed by Operational Funds
29 of POs that, in turn, are 
funded by levies on producers.
30  POs can withdraw
31 or “not put up for sale” any 
products covered by the law in whatever quantity and for whatever period they want.
32  
This is the case for citrus, tomatoes and dairy.  When withdrawals are made, POs must 
pay their producer members the EU withdrawal compensation up to the ceiling set for the 
quantity of product withdrawn from market.
33  The POs provide withdrawal 
compensation up to a EU ceiling set for each marketing year.
34  The present ceilings
35 on 
withdrawals have been reduced to 10% of marketed product for the 2001/02 marketing 
year and to 5% from the 2002/3 marketing year and beyond.
36  The average amount of 
withdrawal compensation for oranges in 2002 was Euro 14.00 per ton, 2000/01 was Euro 
14.13 per ton, and 1997/8 was Euro14.33 per ton.
37  The unsold withdrawn products must 
be disposed of in prescribed ways that do not affect the internal market price.
38  EU 
                                                 
28 At 71. 
29 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 15, 2. Operational funds as indicated in paragraph 1 shall be used 
to: (a) finance both market withdrawals and processing of citrus fruit on the terms set out in paragraph 3; 
30 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 15, 1. “EU financial assistance shall be granted on the terms set out 
in this Article to producer organizations setting up an operational fund. This fund shall be maintained by 
financial contributions levied on member producers on the basis of the quantities or value of fruit and 
vegetables actually marketed and from the financial assistance…” 
31 The quantities that may be withdrawn from the market are limited by Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 
32 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 23, 1. “Producer organizations and their associations may choose 
not to put up for sale products listed in Article 1 (2) contributed by their members, both in quantities and 
for periods which they consider appropriate.” 
33 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 23, 3.   
34 “Report From the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 
2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables” COM (2001) 36 final at 21. 
35 Set by articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 as a percentage of marketed quantity 
36 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000.   
37 “Report From the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 
2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables” COM (2001) 36 final at 23. 
38 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 Article 30, 1 (b) fruit: free distribution to school children, other than as part 
of the meals served in school canteens, and to pupils in schools which do not have canteens providing 
meals   11
withdrawal compensation limits
39 were reduced to 5% for citrus and 10% for a list of 
products that includes tomatoes for the 2002/3 marketing year.
40   
Intervention Thresholds and Direct Producer Aid 
The 1996 reforms created processing thresholds
41 that are referenced to determine 
the level of direct aid to producers.  A Member State exceeding the processing 
threshold
42 causes a proportional reduction
43 in the current year’s aid.
44   Citrus thresholds 
are set in terms of raw, not processed, products.   
As of 2001, the direct aid
45 amounts for citrus remain unchanged, but the 
processing thresholds have increased.
46  In the 2001/02 marketing year, processing 
thresholds for oranges increased 26.2% over 2000/01 levels to 1,500,236 tons.
47  For 
lemons there was a 15% increase to 510,600 tons.
48  The total aid remains largely 
unchanged.
49 Also, the ceiling for withdrawals
50 from the market fell for 2001/2002 to 
10% from 15% of the quantity marketed by producers and to 5% in 2002/2003.  This 
funding can be used to supplement EU withdrawal compensation.
51   
                                                 
39 Set by Council Regulation (EC) 2200/96 
40 Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000.  For the 2001/3 marketing year, the ceilings were 
10% for citrus and 20% for other products.  Also, this article allowed growers who are not members of a 
collective structure to benefit from Article 23 of 2200/96 aid, but EU withdrawal compensation must be 
reduced by 10%. 
41 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, article 27. 
42 Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 Article (5) 1. Processing thresholds shall be established, on the one 
hand, for lemons, grapefruit and oranges separately, and, on the other hand, for mandarins, clementines and 
satsumas taken together 
43 Council Regulation (EC) No 858/1999 of 22 April 1999.  Reductions in aid are directly proportional to 
the threshold overrun. 
44 See Generally Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 of 28 October 1996 introducing a EU aid scheme for 
producers of certain citrus fruits, Official Journal L 297, 21/11/1996 P. 0049 - 0052 
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 introduces a new aid scheme for certain citrus fruits. 
46 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000. 
47 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index_en.htm  
48 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index_en.htm  
49 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index_en.htm  
50 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, article 23. 
51 Both oranges and tomatoes may qualify for withdrawal compensation (See Annex II of the article).  
Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 15, 3 (b).  This article also sets limits on the EU withdrawal   12
Recent increases in EU thresholds are accompanied by reductions in aid per ton
52, 
so that total expenditures of the EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund) are unchanged.  Prior to 2000, limits in aid to POs was based on two limits, 4.5% 
of the value of production marketed by each PO, and 2.5% of the total marketed of all 
POs.  Under the new system there is a single ceiling to apply to all POs, 3%. There was 
an overrun during the 2000/01 marketing year in France and Spain, whose aid for 
grapefruit and pomelos was reduced for the 2001/02 marketing year by 18.46% and 
8.16%, respectively.
53 
Support Mechanisms for Tomatoes 
Consistent with the market liberalization trend in Europe, in 2000 the EU made 
major changes to the common market organization for tomatoes.
54  These changes were 
to be less market distorting because, while maintaining roughly the same level of aid to 
European tomato producers, that aid is now somewhat decoupled from production 
decisions.  More market flexibility exists after the 2000 changes, less product can be 
removed from the market, and supports for exports have declined. 
Most importantly, the former quota system of 1996-2000, which was widely 
suspected of introducing rigidity into the market, was replaced by a more flexible system 
                                                                                                                                                 
compensation: “The proportion of the operational fund which may be used to finance withdrawals may not 
exceed 60 % in the first year, 55 % in the second, 50 % in the third, 45 % in the fourth, 40 % in the fifth 
and 30 % from the sixth year onwards.”  No more than 50% of the EU support may be used for 
withdrawals and citrus processing.  5(b): “financial assistance shall be capped at 4 % of the value of the 
marketed production of each producer organization, provided that the total amount of financial assistance 
represents less than 2 % of the total turnover of all producer organizations.”  Council Regulation (EC) No 
2699/2000 removes the “total turnover of all producer organizations” limit on financial assistance and 
increases the financial assistance allowed to each producer organization from 4% to 4.1%.  
52 Reductions in aid are in proportion to the volume of overrun over the threshold set.  Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2699/2000 of 4 December 2000, L 311/14. 
53 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1931/2001. 
54 Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 is a major piece of legislation that reformed the common 
organization of the fruit and vegetables market.     13
of processing thresholds
55 and corresponding aid reductions.
56   This is almost identical to 
the citrus threshold system.  The processed tomato quota system
57 was based on 
“compensatory aid” paid to the processor in return for the payment of a minimum floor 
price to producers with aid fixed by unit weight of product processed.
58  
Except for 1997/8, this quota was consistently overrun from 1996 to 2000.
59  The 
threshold for 2001/02 is 8,251,455 tons, which is a 20.7% increase over the quota for 
2000/01.
60  As of 1998, the EU imports 4% of the world tomato production and exports 
7% of the world tomato production.
61  Additionally, very little of the world’s fresh 
tomato production is exported fresh.  The leading producers of tomatoes for processing in 
1999/2000 were the US (11.6 million tons, vs. 8.5 million in 1998/99), the EU (9.1 
million tons vs. 8 million) and Turkey (1.8 vs. 1.7).
62  EU aid was paid on 6.9 million 
tons, which was the quota tonnage.  Except for 1997/8, this quota has consistently been 
                                                 
55 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Proposal for a Council Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables, Regulation 
(EC) No 2201/96 on the common organization of the market in processed fruit and vegetables and 
Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 introducing a EU aid scheme for producers of certain citrus fruits" 
Official Journal C 014, 16/01/2001 P. 0157 - 0165. 
56 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common 
organization of the fruit and vegetables market, 2201/96 on the common organization of the processed fruit 
and vegetable market, and 2202/96, which introduced an EU aid scheme for producers of certain citrus 
fruits.   
57 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of the markets in 
processed fruit and vegetable products, Official Journal L 297, 21/11/1996 P. 0029 – 0048 Article 6, 1. “A 
quota system is hereby introduced for granting production aid for products processed from tomatoes. The 
production aid shall be limited to a volume of processed products corresponding to a weight of 6 836 262 
tonnes of fresh tomatoes.” 
58 See Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (6). 
59 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index_en.htm  
60 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index_en.htm  
61 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of 
the European Communities at 69. 
62 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of 
the European Communities at 132.   14
overrun thru 2000.  The threshold for 2001/02 is 8,251,455 tons, which is a 20.7% 
increase over the quota for 2000/01.
63 
Export Refunds
64 and Other Trade Policies 
Other trade policies include import quotas, tariffs
65, and additional duties on 
imports
66.  Imports into the EU above a certain level—501,111 tons from October 1 to 
March 31, and 639,884 tons from April 1 to September 30—trigger additional import 
duties on tomato products.  Favorable bilateral trade agreements—allowed by the WTO 
under GATT—with tomato producing countries like Turkey and Morocco all but 
eliminate any potential tomato exports from the US to the EU.  As a result of these 
bilateral agreements, which are highly structured quota arrangements, all of the EU’s 
excess demand is satisfied without American tomatoes. 
Product Withdrawals Compensation 
This is the same system and set up as in the citrus market.  The average amount of 
withdrawal compensation for tomatoes in 2002 was Euro 4.83 per ton, for 2000/01 was 
Euro 5.47 per ton, and for 1997/98 was Euro 6.44 per ton.
67  In 2000, EU tomato 
withdrawals represented 1.2% of EU production.
68  EU withdrawal compensation 
limits
69, which indirectly limit the amount of product that may be withdrawn from the 
                                                 
63 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index_en.htm  
64 Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 
65 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2201/96(15). 
66 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1512/2000.   
67 “Report From the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 
2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables” COM (2001) 36 final at 23. 
68 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of 
the European Communities at 71. 
69 Set by Council Regulation (EC) 2200/96   15
market, were reduced to 5% for citrus and 10% for a list of products that includes 
tomatoes for the 2002/3 marketing year.
70   
Intervention Thresholds and Direct Producer Aid 
In 2000, the quota system-- EU aid scheme for tomato processing governed by 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/96(5)-- was replaced by a processing threshold system.  The 
threshold system is meant to be less market distorting than the quota system that made 
the tomato market too rigid to allow the processors to adapt to market demand 
fluctuations quickly enough.   
The main differences between the old quota system and the new processing 
threshold system are the minimum price and who actually receives the aid.  Under the 
quota system, aid was paid to the processors who paid at least the minimum floor price, 
with aid reduced when the quota was exceeded.
71  The threshold system provides aid 
directly to the producer via POs, and the threshold system has no minimum price, just an 
amount of aid based on quantity delivered for processing.
72  These recent modifications 
copied the citrus system, which already had direct payments to POs, in place of the old 
tomato quota system of compensatory aid to processors who had to pay producers a 
minimum price set each year by the European Commission, the EU’s executive body. 
                                                 
70 Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000.  For the 2001/3 marketing year, the ceilings were 
10% for citrus and 20% for other products.  Also, this article allowed growers who are not members of a 
collective structure to benefit from Article 23 of 2200/96 aid, but EU withdrawal compensation must be 
reduced by 10%. 
71 Commission Regulation (EC) No 504/97 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 on production aid, Official Journal L 078, 20/03/1997 P. 0014 - 0023 
72 Commission Regulation (EC) No 449/2001 of 2 March 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 as regards the aid scheme for products processed from fruit and 
vegetables, Official Journal L 064, 06/03/2001 P. 0016 – 0029, Article 14, 1. Aid for tomatoes, peaches 
and pears shall be paid by the competent body of the Member State in which the producer organization 
signing the contract has its head office, as soon as that body has checked the aid application and established 
that the products covered by that application have been delivered and accepted for processing, on the basis, 
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Under the threshold system, a single EU threshold is fixed by tons of fresh 
tomatoes intended for processing rather than by tons of processed
73 tomatoes, with a level 
above the marketing year 2000 quota to allow for expanding demand.
74  When this 
threshold is surpassed, the following year’s aid is reduced to the Member State in 
proportion to the overrun.  In 2002, aid for producers in Member States not exceeding the 
threshold is 34.50 Euro/ton of fresh tomatoes, regardless of the finished product 
classification or existing market prices.  For the 2000/2001 marketing year, the EU 
threshold was 8,251,455 tons, which is 20.7% above the old EU quota for 2000/2001.  
Aid for the 2000/01 marketing year for Member States that did not overrun the threshold 
was Euro 31,36/ton.
75  For marketing years 2002/3 and 2003/4, the aid is set at Euro 
34.50/ton.
76   
In the 2001/02 marketing year, tomatoes were above threshold in some Member 
States.  In these States, the aid is reduced to Euro 31.36 per ton, with a supplement set by 
the Commission to be paid after the marketing year to producers in Member States that 
do not exceed the threshold by more than 10%.
77  For the 2001/02 marketing year, the aid 
supplement
78 is Euro 3.14/ton in Greece, France and Portugal, EUR 2.70/ton in Italy, 
                                                 
73 Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (5).  This regulation repeals a number of regulations that set up this 
support mechanism:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1709/84 on minimum prices payable to producers 
and levels of production aid, last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1573/1999(13), Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2022/92 on the rules for applying the minimum price paid to producers for certain tomatoes, and 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 regarding the system of quotas for processed tomato products, as amended by 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2807/98(16). 
74 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (4) 
75 Article 5(3)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96.   
76 Article 5(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96.   
77 Article 5(3)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96.  Any 2002/03 marketing year overrun of the processing 
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Euro 3.14/ton in Spain for tomatoes intended for processing into whole peeled tomatoes, 
Euro 0.10/ton in Spain for tomatoes intended for processing into other tomato products.
79   
Direct aid to producers is reduced when thresholds are overrun.
80  For 2001/2, 
determination of whether the threshold is overrun is based on the quantity of tomatoes 
processed during the year.
81  For the 2002/3 year, this determination is based on the 
previous year’s quantity.  For the 2003/4 year, threshold overrun is based on the average 
quantity from the first and second years.
82 
    After the 2000 reform, there is a new, higher ceiling on the amount of aid that is 
granted to POs.
83 This ceiling-- 4.1% production ceiling, which is a higher ceiling on 
direct aid to producers from January 2001
84-- replaces two ceilings on aid to producers, 
4.5% of the value of production and 2.5% of total turnover of all producers.  The ceiling 
is meant to place a limit on the amount of subsidies from the EU to the producers.  Total 
aid to POs may not exceed either of these ceilings.  The support for the tomato processors 
is expected to be at roughly the same level as 1999/2000.  For the 2001/2 marketing year, 
the direct aid to POs (and some individual producers satisfying the same requirements) 
for tomatoes that go to processing was Euro 34.50/ton.
85  For the 2001/2 marketing year, 
individual producers were also eligible for this aid for a quantity not more than 25% of 
                                                 
79 Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 175/2002  
80 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1931/2001 reducing the amount of aid for grapefruit and pomelos 
for the 2001/02 marketing year after the processing threshold for 2000/01 was exceeded. 
81 Article 5 (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000. 
82 Article 5 (4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000. 
83 Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96.  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1144/2001 fixes, for Regulation 
(EC) No 411/97, a ceiling for EU aid granted to producer organizations that set up operational funds for 
2000.  Regulation (EC) No 411/97 was repealed in 2001 by Commission Regulation (EC) No 609/2001, 
setting a new ceiling for aid and replacing the double ceiling with a single ceiling.   
84 Amending Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and 
vegetables, Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 on the common organization of the market in processed fruit and 
vegetables and Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 introducing a EU aid scheme for producers of certain citrus 
fruits. 
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the amount contracted for marketing.
86  For the 2002/03 marketing year, the direct aid to 
POs for processing
87 is set at Euro 34.50/ton in Greece, France and Portugal, Euro 
34.06/ton in Italy, Euro 34.50/ton in Spain for tomatoes intended for processing into 
whole peeled tomatoes, and Euro 31.46/ton in Spain for tomatoes intended for processing 
into other tomato products.  The EU aid scheme for POs supplying tomatoes was set up 
by Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (2).   
Support Mechanisms for Dairy 
In 2001, the EU was both the largest producer and the largest consumer of cow’s 
milk in the world, with 21.3% and 21% respectively, compared to the US’ 13.1% and 
12%.
88  Only 6.9% of world milk production (40.8 million tons) was traded in 2001.
89  
Almost none of that is liquid milk.  The bulk of trade is in the form of butter, cheese, and 
powdered milk.
90  About 2/3 of EU milk production is used for butter, cheese, or skim 
milk.
91  In 1997, farms with fewer than 50 cows accounted for 52% of all dairy cattle in 
the EU, versus 68.5% in 1985.
92  In 1995, the average number of dairy cows per farm 
was only 23.
93  Given this status, the broad and highly structured supports for the dairy 
sector are not unexpected.   
Support mechanisms affecting milk include public intervention, intervention 
prices, private storage aid, domestic consumption aid (or disposal aid), milk quotas, and 
                                                 
86 Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (3)(1).   
87 Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 provides for an aid scheme to assist producer organizations 
delivering tomatoes, peaches and Williams and Rocha pears for processing 
88 In tons of milk.  Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 
final, p. 5. 
89 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 5. 
90 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 5. 
91 Special Report No 8/2000 on the EU measures for the disposal of butterfat accompanied by the 
Commission's replies, Official Journal C 132, 12/05/2000 P. 0001 - 0032 
92 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, together with the Commission's replies, Official Journal C 305, 
30/10/2001 P. 0001 – 0034 (24).   19
export refunds.
94  Of these, only disposal is a demand-side mechanism.  These 
mechanisms are used to achieve a target price for milk sold at the producer level.  The 
current target price for fluid milk is 309.8 Euro/ton at 3.7% fat.
95  Maintaining the target 
price is the principal objective of all of the dairy support mechanisms, including public 
intervention and export refunds.   
These support mechanisms are expensive to both consumers and taxpayers.   
Maintaining the target price results in milk producers receiving 54 percent of their 
revenue from the EU for an estimated cost of over 20 billion euro a year.
96  In addition to 
higher prices paid for the products, taxpayer’s pay for these subsidies, with expenditures 
on subsidies to the dairy market at Euro 2.5 billion per year as of 2000.
97  Although still 
high, support levels in total for dairy have fallen considerably since 1983, from 4285.3 
million Euros in 1983 to 2601.3 million Euros in 1999.
98  Since 1995, almost 28% of the 
quantity of butter consumed in the EU has been granted EU aid
99 representing about 30% 
of market price, and skim milk powder aid (fixed at 35% of the market price) was paid on 
more than half of the EU consumption level.
100  In 2000, nearly 25 million tons of milk 
equivalent was disposed of (i.e. demand-side aid) at a cost of 2601 million Euros.   
                                                                                                                                                 
93 “Agriculture, Environment, Rural Development – Facts and Figures” 3/16/2001, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/envir/report/en/live_en/report.htm  
94 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 6; See also 
Regulation (EC) No 1255/ 1999, part of Agenda 2000; See also the milk quota regime Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 856/84 and Council Regulation (EEC) No857/84, derogated by Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92, 
and later amended by Regulation (EC) No 1256/1999 for Agenda 2000. 
95 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7. 
96 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 - 0034. The 
“producer subsidy equivalent” for milk is 54% of the value of output compared to 44% for all agricultural 
products. 
97 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 – 0034.  
98 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 - 0034  
Milk and milk-products sector expenditures have decreased from 4285.3 million euros in 1983 to 2601,3 
million euros in 1999. 
99 Special Report No 8/2000 on the EU measures for the disposal of butterfat accompanied by the 
Commission's replies, Official Journal C 132, 12/05/2000 P. 0001 - 0032   20
Additional levy payments, or penalties on producers for exceeding the dairy quota, 
recaptured 16% of these expenditures from producers.
101 
Intervention and Direct Producer Aid 
Intervention mechanisms exist for butter and skim milk powder.  Each Member 
State’s intervention agency must buy skim milk powder at the intervention price from 
March 1 to August 31 each year, but the Commission may suspend the buying if 
quantities exceed 109,000 tons.
 102  The product purchased is state property held in 
storage.  When the price of butter in a Member State falls below 92% of the intervention 
price during a certain period, the Member State must buy butter at a price set by the 
Commission that may not be lower than 90% of the intervention price.
 103   There is no 
intervention quantity limit for butter. 
Aid For Private Storage 
Public stocks of skim milk powder and cheese may qualify for private storage aid 
if a serious market imbalance exists that could be ameliorated by seasonal storage.
104  
The amount of aid is determined by actual storage costs.  The Commission may require 
that the Member State’s intervention agency remarket some of the products if market 
conditions so require. 
Disposal Aid 
This aid includes several measures used to stimulate dairy consumption, including 
aid for use of skim milk and butterfat for animal feed, aid for supplying schools with 
                                                                                                                                                 
100 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 - 0034 
101 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 - 0034 
102 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7. 
103 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7. 
104 Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 granting private storage aid for butter, cheese, and cream; 
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milk, and, when public stocks build up, the Commission may grant aid to promote cream, 
butter and concentrated butter purchases at reduced prices by certain groups.
105  These 
groups include non-profit groups, Member States’ military, producer of pastries, ice 
cream, and “other foodstuffs,” and consumers of concentrated butter.
106  In 2000, disposal 
aid expenditure was Euro 449 million for butter and Euro 708 million for skim milk.
107  
The aid for milk to schoolchildren was 89 million Euros in 1999.
108  In 1998, disposal aid 
represented 20% of the total EU milk sector expenditures.
109  These are the latest figures 
available. 
Export Refunds 
To maintain internal dairy prices, export refunds are paid to help remove excess 
supply.  These are given to exporters to make up the difference between world market 
prices and EU prices and they are the same rate for the entire EU.
110  The refund rates and 
quantities are set each year by the Commission according to market needs in order to 
maintain the target price, and are ultimately controlled via a system of export licenses 
issued each year.
111  Together with internal consumption subsidies, export refunds cost 
the EU budget 3 billion Euros per year in 2000 with almost 15 million tons of subsidized 
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the market in milk and milk products, Official Journal L 160, 26/06/1999 P. 0048 - 0072 
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110 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 174/1999 setting detailed rules for applying Council Regulation 
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export of dairy products.
112  The resulting expenditure on export refunds (ECU 420 
million in 1998) is also less than half of the maximum amount permitted. 
113 
Milk Quota Regime 
Since 1984, quotas have been used to stabilize prices by constraining production 
to keep it in line with projected consumption.  Quotas were initially allocated to each 
country and to each producer in 1984 based on historical production and new quotas 
levels were negotiated for new EU members as they joined the EU.
114     
Quotas are set by volume and adjusted by milk fat content.
115  Under the quota 
system, an “additional levy”, set at 115% of the target price of milk, is charged to the 
producer for all volume above the quota set by the Council for each Member State for a 
given year.
116  Exceeding the reference milk fat level triggers an “additional levy” of 
155% of the milk target price.
 117  All producers who caused the oversupply by exceeding 
their individual quotas are charged the levy.   
 
Quota overruns at the producer or farm level can be offset by other individual 
quota shortfalls or unused quotas in any manner decided by the Member State.
118  The 
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levy is charged to the individual dairy producers by milk purchasers, or to direct sellers of 
the milk by the authorized national administration.
119  If it were charged to the countries 
rather than the producers, then it would effectively be a subsidy from the Member State 
to the producers of that State, defeating the purpose of the quota.    Today,  quotas  may 
not be traded between countries, but can be transferred within each country according to 
individual country regulations.  In France, for example, the quotas are attached to the 
land.
120  Smaller farmers tend to receive reallocated quotas in the Member States.
121   
The original quota level was 103.7 million tons in 1984.
122  In 1992, the total 
quota was reduced by 10.5% for the 10 Member States, but increased by 13.8 million 
tons to allow for Spain and Portugal joining the EU and to allow for German 
reunification.
123  For the 1992/3 marketing year, the total quota was 106.9 million tons.  
Italy, Spain, and Greece negotiated a 1.6 million ton quota increase in 1993, and Austria, 
Sweden, and Finland negotiated an 8.4 million ton quota increase when they became 
Member States in 1995.
124  Finally, Agenda 2000, explained below, will increase the 
quota by 2.4% from a 1999/2000-reference year when it takes effect in 2005.
125  Unless 
changed, the milk quota system is set to expire in 2006. 
Quotas and intervention prices have opposite effects.  Quotas are a production 
limiting mechanism that is meant to maintain high internal prices, but the relatively high 
intervention price causes milk producers to produce up to the quota maximum even when 
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the quota would not be a limiting factor.  This leads to accruals of public intervention 
stocks.  Export subsidies and import restrictions would aid the quotas in maintaining high 
internal prices.
126   
Agenda 2000 
In response to a Court of Auditors
127 requirement for “a fundamental reform of 
the dairy sector aiming at achieving equilibrium between overall milk production and 
unsubsidized internal consumption plus potential unsubsidized exports while ensuring a 
fair standard of living for dairy farmers and allowing the quota regime to expire,” Agenda 
2000, an extension of the 1992 reform for market policy, represents a significant step 
towards CAP reform.  Contained in the Agenda 2000 agreement were important changes 
for the dairy market.   
Under the original Agenda 2000 proposal, market prices would decline via a 15% 
cut in intervention support prices in four steps from 2000 onward and a 2% increase in 
quotas while compensation is paid to farmers.  However, in March 1999 the European 
Council delayed the main elements of this reform until the 2005/6 marketing year
128, with 
the reform phased-in over three years and the quota increased by 2.4% from a 1999/2000 
reference year for some Member States and a flat-rate increase of 1.5% for the remaining 
Member States in the 2005/6 – 2007/8 periods.
129  These reforms are projected to 
effectively improve market balance, cause intervention stocks to fluctuate at low levels, 
reduce reliance on export refunds, and significantly lower internal consumption aids; 
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Direct payments to producers are expected to adequately compensate them for price 
reductions.
130  They would be introduced in three equal steps over three years from 
2005/6 marketing year in the form of direct payments to producers called dairy premia 
(5.75 Euros going to 17.24 Euros per ton of quota) and additional payments, including 
“top-up” premia and regional payments.   
The full effect of the Agenda 2000 reforms will not be felt until 2008 and the EU 
is already considering four alternatives for 2008-2015.  First, continuation of Agenda 
2000 thru 2015.  Second, Repeating the Agenda 2000 approach by further increasing 
quotas (+3%) and reducing intervention prices (-15% butter and –5% skimmed milk 
powder).  Third, introducing a 2-tiered quota system under which EU quotas are reduced 
by 5% to establish a domestic quota, while export quotas would be unlimited and export 
refunds and disposal aids would be cancelled.  Lastly, the final reform is the removal of 
the Quota System altogether in 2008 and cutting intervention support by an additional 
25%.   
 Significant reform of the milk sector along these lines is scheduled to begin in 
2005.
131  The present milk quota arrangements will run out after 2006.
132  Recent dairy 
CAP reform includes a quota increase and a 15% drop in intervention prices for butter 
and skimmed milk powder.
133 
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Conclusion 
  European Union (EU) consumers pay almost twice the competitive world price 
for many agricultural products. Agricultural subsidies accounted for almost half of the 
EU’s total budget (US$ 40 billion on agriculture in 2000) although agriculture 
represented 1.7 percent of the EU’s GDP and employs 4.3% of the EU’s population. 
Domestic policies for citrus and tomatoes include export refunds, product withdraws 
from the market, intervention thresholds, and direct producer aid. Domestic policies for 
dairy include export refunds, intervention thresholds, aid for private storage, disposal aid, 
and milk quotas. The EU’s intentions are to enhance agricultural competitiveness by 
setting product intervention as “a real safety net measure, allowing EU producers to 
respond to market signals while protecting them from extreme price fluctuations,” and 
promoting market oriented, sustainable agriculture by finishing the transition from 
product support to producer support, by introducing a “decoupled system of payments per 
farm” which are not connected to production. The EU wishes to allow flexibility in 
production, but also guarantee income stability to producers.  Within the last 10 years, the 
EU has reduced price supports and increased direct payments to tomato, dairy, and citrus 
farmers to compensate them for the reductions. 
 